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In late February 1970, members of the British House of Commons gathered to 
debate the White Paper on Britain’s potential membership of the European 
Community (EC). Opening the session for the Labour government, the Foreign 
Secretary, Michael Stewart, explained how the party’s approach to the EC »has 
been steadily based since 1967«. »We have made our application«, Stewart 
continued, »it stands, we press it, we desire that negotiations should be opened. 
And we are anxious that they should succeed«1. While there were still important 
questions to answer regarding British accession – not least the economic 
arguments over which the White Paper was in part designed to address – Stewart 
did not stop at insisting that London was once again prepared to enter into 
negotiations with Brussels. It also, he made clear, firmly believed that the Six now 
wanted to see Britain join. After nearly a decade of trying, it seemed that British 
accession was finally at hand.  
 There was a good deal to suggest that on the third time of asking Britain 
might well end up in an enlarged Community as Stewart hoped. For a start, 
Charles de Gaulle’s departure from the Élysée earlier in April 1969 appeared to 
mark a new mood in the EC. And by the time of the Hague Summit just eight 
months later the Community had itself made huge advances in its operation2. Not 
only had the Six agreed to the completion of the EC’s transnational period and 
                                                
1 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 24 February 1970, vol. 796, col. 997.  
2 On the Hague Summit see in particular the special edition of Journal of European Integration History 9 
(2003).  
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resolved outstanding disagreements over Community financing. They had also 
taken a decisive step forward in deepening integration to extend the Community’s 
competences into a number of new areas, including economic and monetary union 
(EMU). Having sorted out two of the most pressing questions concerning its 
internal workings, Brussels was therefore in a position to turn its attention once 
more to the third and altogether more controversial of its aims: enlargement.  
 The Labour leadership was likewise optimistic that the party would once 
again swing behind the government and support the bid to join the Community. 
After all, and thanks mostly to cajoling on the part of leader and then prime 
minister Harold Wilson, Labour ministers had endorsed the principle of British 
membership back in 19673. The movement more widely, it is true, had divided on 
the question. But few in the Labour cabinet had found themselves able to disagree 
that the political arguments in favour of Britain’s accession were highly attractive. 
In the party’s October conference of that same year moreover, and in the three 
subsequent annual meetings up until 1970, Labour had continued to support 
membership dependent on certain safeguards for Britain and the Commonwealth4. 
Wilson’s strategic goal thereafter remained securing membership of the Six5. As 
tentative negotiations between Britain and the Six opened in the spring of 1970, it 
thus appeared likely that he would not only achieve his aim but would carry large 
swathes of the Labour movement with him.  
 Aware as Wilson and Stewart both no doubt still were of the difficulties in 
keeping Labour united over ›Europe‹, neither man could scarcely have predicted 
the scale of the problems that they would soon encounter. A measure of just how 
toxic the debate would become was already clear when, within a year of returning 
to opposition in June 1970, the party rejected the terms of Britain’s accession to 
the Community. Due in no small part to the ascendency of the Labour left, by 
March 1972 the ruling National Executive Committee (NEC) pledged both to 
                                                
3 Helen PARR, Britain’s policy towards the European Community. Harold Wilson and Britain’s world role, 
1964–1967, Abingdon 2006, p. 146–147.  
4 Labour Party, Labour Party Annual Report, London 1967, p. 329–332. The conditions were: safeguards for 
the Commonwealth, protection for the other countries of the European Free Trade Area, freedom to plan 
foreign, economic and social policy, and safeguards for British agriculture.  
5 Melissa PINE, Harold Wilson and Europe. Pursuing Britain’s membership of the European Communities, 
London 2007, p. 1.  
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renegotiate the so-called ›Tory terms‹ agreed by Edward Heath and, if successful, 
hold a referendum on continued membership. It was only Wilson’s threat of 
resignation in October the following year that prevented the conference going 
even further and supporting withdrawal altogether6. Considering that Labour 
regarded Britain’s membership as effectively in suspense, the Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP) did however agree in the meantime to boycott its seats in the 
European Parliament (EP). Within a matter of three years, it appeared that Labour 
had abruptly shifted its entire approach to British entry.  
 Nor could they have foreseen the hostility that would continue to dominate 
the party’s approach to membership after regaining power in February 1974. 
Much of Labour’s attention centred initially on the 1975 referendum. But even 
after this, party sentiment not only remained antagonistic but seemed to turn 
increasingly anti-federalist. The NEC for instance objected to British inclusion in 
EMU and called for reforms to a whole raft of existing Community policies. If 
Labour was hostile, however, nowhere was it perhaps more obvious than over its 
response to cooperation with socialist groups within the Community. According 
to earlier accounts at least, Labour found membership of the Confederation of the 
Socialist Parties of the EC an »unacceptable constraint on its autonomy« and 
refused to join it as anything other than an observer7. Part of this hostility, so the 
story goes, also fed into doubts over association with the Socialist Group in the 
EP, an issue once again after Labour had reneged on its earlier boycott in light of 
the referendum result8. Soon enough the party was criticising direct elections and, 
having accepted them as inevitable, refused to have its candidates stand on a joint 
platform with the Confederation in the first direct elections of June 1979. To make 
matters worse, the result was a disaster for Labour, the party barely winning a 
third of the seventy-eight seats available. Britain may well have secured entry as 
                                                
6 Harold WILSON, Final Term: The Labour Government 1974–76, London 1979, p. 51.  
7 Simon HIX and Christopher LORD, A model transnational party? The Party of European Socialists, in: David 
S. BELL and Christopher LORD (eds.) Transnational parties in the European Union, Ashgate 1998, p. 89. See 
also Jens Henrik HAAHR, Looking to Europe. The EC policies of the British Labour Party and the Danish 
Social Democrats, Aarhus 1993, p. 80–81.  
8 Roger BROAD, Labour’s European dilemmas. From Bevin to Blair, Basingstoke 2001, p. 124.  
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Stewart had predicted nine years earlier, but in the process Labour had seemingly 
become electorally irrelevant at home and increasingly isolated abroad.  
 What follows in this chapter is not an attempt fundamentally to reinterpret 
this picture. There is after all no escaping that in the 1970s Labour split over the 
question of British membership of the EC. With an eye to events beyond the 
national setting and by paying particular attention to the interaction between 
Labour and its socialist counterparts, however, what this chapter will do is suggest 
two main reasons that the story presented above was a little more complex. For 
while elements of the party certainly did reject forms of cooperation in the form of 
the Confederation and the Socialist Group in the EP, informal transnational 
relations outside the Community framework remained a mainstay in the 
leadership’s approach to the integration process throughout the 1970s. Labour’s 
more general criticism of European integration, to put it another way, did not 
negate the importance of cross-border political contact for the party elite. A 
second reason to be slightly more sceptical of this narrative it will argue is that 
such scepticism within the party did not prevent the Labour leadership from doing 
its utmost to ensure full participation within both the Confederation and the EP 
Socialist Group. Traditional descriptions of the party being wholly against such 
cooperation prior to direct elections in 1979, it will thus propose, are somewhat 
simplistic. As divided as the party doubtless was, then, its links with other 
socialist groups do perhaps need to be given greater weight in order to understand 
a little more fully this most fundamental period in Labour’s recent history.  
 
Labour, ›Europe‹ and the beginning of party cooperation 
Conventional wisdom on Labour and European integration has the party following 
a largely negative line after the Second World War. The point often made, with 
clear justification, is that at the heart of Labour thinking after 1945 were not 
European affairs but rather global ones9. Under the administration of Clement 
Attlee, Labour was certainly far more concerned about maintaining closer links 
                                                
9 BROAD, Labour’s European dilemmas (as in n. 8), p. 4–17; Rhiannon VICKERS, The evolution of Labour’s 
foreign policy 1900–51, Manchester 2004, p. 159–187.  
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with the white Commonwealth, and to a lesser extent with the United States and 
Asia, than developing them with continental European states10. In office there 
were of course clear exceptions to this rule, including with the creation of the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948. Yet 
those organisations in which Britain was involved were all notable for their 
distinctly intergovernmental frameworks. In many cases Labour ministers 
negotiated opt-outs and exceptions that retained Whitehall’s decision-making 
capacity. By contrast, supranationalism was something viewed as dangerous, an 
infringement on both national sovereignty and the right of the party to plan its 
own economic and political course for Britain. It was this attitude that coloured 
Labour’s initial response to the European integration process. In its official 
response to the Schuman Plan for instance the party declared unambiguously how 
»no Socialist Party with the prospect of forming a government could accept a 
system by which important fields of national policy were surrendered to a supra-
national European representative authority«11. And this attitude clearly fed 
through into its attitude towards European cooperation well into the 1960s. 
Indeed, as recent research has shown, it was in fact not until around 1966 that 
Labour ›turned‹ towards EC membership, and only then as a pragmatic response 
to Britain’s shifting world role12. 
 Less often discussed in the literature but doubtless still very significant is 
the idea that Labour did not react to all of these developments alone; the party’s 
continuing evaluation of the integration process was in fact often carried out in 
tandem with other socialist groups in Western Europe. To those in Labour perhaps 
suspicious of ›continental‹ socialists, contact of this type was not always 
welcome. As Denis Healey never tired of arguing, informal relations between 
Labour and its Scandinavian counterparts often held greater weight for the party 
than relations with other socialist groups13. And it is perhaps no accident that it 
                                                
10 Labour Party, Labour Party Annual Report, London 1945, p. 115.  
11 Labour Party, European Unity. A Statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labour 
Party, London 1950, p. 8.  
12 PARR, Britain’s policy (as in n. 3), p. 185–190.  
13 Denis HEALEY, The International Socialist Conference 1946–50, in: International Affairs 25 (1950), p. 364; 
Denis HEALEY, The Time Of My Life, London 1989, p. 95.  
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was Labour and its sister groups across the North Sea that had earlier led the 
charge against the newly inaugurated Socialist International enforcing binding 
decisions on national parties14. At the same time, discussions on topics such as the 
Schuman Plan were a constant item on the International’s agenda after 1951 – and 
Healey, as Labour’s then international secretary, was in fact a central player in 
such dialogue15. Nor did Labour’s earlier reluctance prevent it from participating 
in the Contact Committee of the Socialist International, established by socialist 
parties in the aftermath of the November 1958 collapse of the Free Trade Area 
(FTA) plan16. Very quickly, it seemed, Labour had learnt the value of 
transnational party cooperation in the overall development of British European 
policy.  
 Importantly, this type of informal cooperation would continue well beyond 
the FTA issue. It did so in three main ways. First, there was the Contact 
Committee itself. Its inaugural meeting in January 1959 saw Labour and other 
groups pool ideas for longer-term alternatives to the FTA. All were convinced that 
a smaller trade area of the non-Six would be both damaging economically and 
have implications for the defence of Western Europe within an increasingly tense 
cold war environment. Hence, Labour agreed – beyond what was then official 
party policy – to work with its socialist counterparts towards a »socialist formula« 
to foster closer links between the Community and what became the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA)17. Thereafter, Labour made habitual use of the Contact 
Committee to garner information about developments within the Community from 
                                                
14 Labour History Archives and Study Centre, Manchester [henceforth LHA], Denis Healey International 
Department papers, Box 3, Denis Healey to Hugh Dalton, 12 February 1946 and Dalton to Healey, 18 
February 1946. On the creation of the Socialist International see Julius BRAUNTHAL, History of the 
International. World Socialism 1943–1968. London 1980. 
15 See for instance Arbejdermuseet & Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, Copenhagen [henceforth 
ABA], Danish SD archive [henceforth SDA], Box 342, Report of the Conference of the Socialist 
International in Brussels 14–16 December 1951, circular no. 15/52, 31 January 1952.  
16 The FTA was a British proposal to confront the creation of the EC by creating an industrial free trade zone 
of the seventeen OEEC states. On reasons for Labour’s decision to participate in the Contact Committee, see 
LHA, NEC Minutes 17 December 1958, minutes of joint meeting of finance and economic policy and 
European cooperation sub-committees, 25 November 1958. On the collapse of the FTA, see among others 
James ELLISON, Threatening Europe. Britain and the Creation of the European Community 1955–58, 
Basingstoke 2000, p. 189–220.  
17 International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam [henceforth IISH], Socialist International archive, 
Box 585, Carthy to Krag, 3 March 1960.  
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the socialist parties of the Six or to liaise with other socialist groups from EFTA18. 
Nearly a decade of collaboration later and the Contact Committee was still a 
useful platform. Labour even used one such meeting of the Committee at the end 
of September 1967 to coerce the EC socialist parties to pressure their respective 
governments into launching negotiations for British membership despite de 
Gaulle’s ›velvet veto‹ four months earlier19.  
 A second but no less important structure was the framework of the Socialist 
International. In May 1966, Labour’s deputy leader George Brown used a meeting 
of the bureau of the Socialist International to seek support for a future application 
by Labour to the Community, although at this stage he stopped short of 
confirming whether Labour actually would join20. Over three years later, Wilson 
likewise used the International’s congress in Eastbourne as a vehicle to build 
consensus around a new British application following the election of Georges 
Pompidou21.  
 But it was a third arena – informal leadership meetings outside of the 
Socialist International and based on the informal nature of the Contact Committee 
– that soon proved the most useful network of all. Certainly, Wilson preferred to 
meet his party counterparts informally, usually with brandy in hand, than through 
other channels open to him22. No gathering was perhaps more significant than that 
at Chequers in April 1965, when leaders from the British, Danish, Norwegian, 
Swedish, Austrian and German parties met to discuss once again expanding links 
between the EC and the seven members of EFTA. Recent research has suggested 
that this meeting confirms that Wilson was committed to joining the Community 
                                                
18 LHA, Labour international department papers, Box 3, Summary Report of Meeting of the Contact 
Committee of the Socialist International, 2 July 1961.  
19 IISH, Socialist International Archive, Box 591, Notes of meeting of the Contact Committee on Europe, 25 
September 1967. The best discussion on the ‘velvet veto’ remains Uwe KITZINGER, The Second Try. Labour 
and the EEC, Oxford 1968, p. 179–188.  
20 ABA, Jens Otto Krag papers, Box 144, transcript of speech by Brown to Socialist International, 5 May 
1966.  
21 Bodleian Library, University of Oxford [henceforth Bodleian], Harold Wilson papers, MS. Wilson c. 1250, 
transcript of speech by Wilson to Socialist International, 16 June 1969.  
22 Bodleian, Harold Wilson papers, MS. Wilson c. 1282, note by Harold Wilson, 21 January 1969.  
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in 196523. The relevant sections of the papers of Jens Otto Krag, the leader of the 
Danish Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet, SD), indicate in fact that Wilson 
was more equivocal about British entry24. Regardless, and even keeping in mind 
Wilson’s reputation as a cunning politician adept at telling different audiences 
very different things, it is evidence of a shift in Labour thinking on the EC at the 
most primitive of stages that few in his own party were privy to. Informal 
discussions retained their significance thereafter, for other groups as much as 
Labour. At the end of 1966, in an ad hoc meeting with Labour’s George Brown, 
Krag was even informed that Labour ministers planned to conduct a ›probe‹ of the 
Six to see whether the conditions existed for another application to the 
Community. This, as it turned out, was before Labour ministers had even 
discussed the issue25.  
 
Function of party relations 
From the analysis above, we can start to discern a number of the key elements of 
Labour’s relationship with its socialist counterparts on the eve of the 1970s. First, 
as should already be clear, cross-border party cooperation was essentially an elite-
driven process. In its dealings with other groups, Labour was often represented by 
Gaitskell or later by Wilson as party leader, other senior political figures like 
George Brown with interests connected to ›Europe‹, or party workers with foreign 
policy briefs such as the heads of the overseas and international departments. 
Labour stalwart and overseas secretary Gwyn Morgan certainly recognised the 
value of such encounters. As he explained to Haakon Lie of the Norwegian 
Labour Party (Det Norske Arbeiderpartiet, DNA) in mid-1967, written 
correspondence was fine but »There will […] be more major problems; e.g. entry 
to the [EC], where a fuller discussion than we can hope to have by 
                                                
23 Kristian STEINNES, Socialist party networks in northern Europe. Moving towards the EEC applications of 
1967, in: Wolfram KAISER, Brigitte LEUCHT and Morten RASMUSSEN (eds.), The History of the European 
Union. Origins of a trans- and supranational polity 1950–72, Abingdon 2009, p. 96–97.  
24 ABA, Jens Otto Krag papers, Box 76, notes of meeting between Krag and Wilson, 23 April 1965.  
25 National Archives, Kew [henceforth TNA], PREM 13/813, record of meeting between Brown and Krag, 18 
October 1966; ABA, Jens Otto Krag papers, Besøg til London, 18 October 1966.  
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correspondence may be necessary«26. At lower levels, by contrast, there were far 
fewer incidences of engagement with other socialist groups beyond national 
boundaries. Why this was the case is not immediately obvious from archival 
material alone. To speculate a little, though, only the Labour leadership or party 
officials working in foreign policy-related briefs had the financial means and 
political prestige necessary to meet with senior figures in other groups. 
Notwithstanding this point, the very nature of representation in the Socialist 
International and other more informal meetings meant it was often leading party 
figures meeting their opposite numbers.  
 Second, and as is equally axiomatic from the discussion above, such 
cooperation between Labour and its socialist counterparts in Europe was largely 
reactionary. The first Contact Committee meeting in 1959 was itself a response to 
the collapse of the FTA, while the meeting of the Committee in September 1967 
came soon after de Gaulle’s ›velvet veto‹ of May that same year. In quite the same 
way, the various speeches delivered to the Socialist International by the likes of 
Brown and Wilson were symptomatic of changes in the wider political 
environment in Europe. Brown’s May 1966 bureau meeting was of course part of 
Labour’s renewed interest in an application to the Community; Wilson’s speech to 
the congress of the Socialist International in June 1969 came on the back of 
Pompidou’s election and the prospect that Britain might once again seek 
accession to the Community. In short, Labour did not deploy cooperation for the 
sake of it; party cooperation was porous and ad hoc, included different actors in 
different fora at different times, and was responsive to developments at both the 
national and European levels.  
 Third, when the Labour leadership did meet other groups, it was principally 
interested in exchanging information27. Meeting with its counterparts gave the 
Labour elite an insight into the policies pursued by other parties, a chance to gain 
knowledge about the integration process and the intricacies of membership. The 
informal nature of the Contact Committee and ad hoc leadership meetings made it 
                                                
26 LHA, Labour international department papers, LP/ID/NOR/3, Morgan to Lie, 21 August 1967.  
27 See also STEINNES, Socialist party networks (as in n. 23), p. 104.  
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especially easy for party figures to talk openly and honestly with one another. 
Importantly, this gave the Labour elite the chance to eschew what at times were 
deeply bitter internal party squabbles over the issue of British membership and 
confront the question in the more relaxed atmosphere provided by the 
transnational setting. 
 Fourth, this is not to say that transfer of information was the only function of 
party cooperation; such collaboration was at times equally suited to influencing 
the policies of other socialist groups. The example of the Contact Committee 
meeting in September 1967 is an obvious case of this. Labour in this example 
hoped to build consensus around a British application. By urging socialist parties 
from the countries of the Six to support the bid, it represented another way both to 
propagate Labour’s goals with regard to the integration process and to pile 
pressure on de Gaulle. Elsewhere, the ability to influence the policies of other 
parties proved as much a hindrance to Labour as it did a help. Soon after 
becoming prime minister for instance, Wilson faced the combined wrath of 
Scandinavian socialists in a leaders’ meeting early in November 1964 over the 
introduction of a surcharge on British imports. The prevailing belief that the 
charge undermined political support in EFTA, and the pressure subsequently 
placed on the Labour leadership by its Scandinavian counterparts in this regard, 
doubtless helped lead to the later abandonment of the plan28. 
 Of greater relevance to a chapter discussing Labour in the run up to the first 
direct elections, however, is that all of these elements were as ubiquitous across 
the 1970s as they were in the late 1950s and 1960s. The archives reveal that in the 
1970s there were two distinct phases in the context of Labour’s relationship with 
its socialist counterparts, each of which fall either side of the June 1975 
referendum. The next section will thus discuss the moment from when Labour 
found itself back in opposition in June 1970 until the referendum five years later. 
The last main section of this chapter will then focus on the period from the 
referendum through to direct elections in 1979. 
                                                
28 For instance ABA, Jens Otto Krag papers, Box 144, notes of Salzburg conference of party leaders 9–10 
January 1965, undated.  
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Towards British membership 
Prior to the 1975 referendum the main function of party cooperation from the 
perspective of the Labour leadership was to attain, and thereafter secure, British 
membership of the Community. The results of such activity quickly emerged after 
Labour returned to opposition in June 1970. Removed from the shackles of office, 
anti-Community sentiment within the party began to grow almost instantly. A 
number of figures in the PLP for example claimed that not only was the new 
battleground in British politics the Common Market. It was, some felt, also an 
issue on which the Conservatives could reasonably be expected to split and from 
which Labour could gain much needed political capital29. Attitudes at the grass 
roots level also became more problematic. By the start of 1971 a steady stream of 
resolutions from constituency parties were reaching Transport House, many 
urging the Labour leadership to propose a referendum or a general election fought 
on the matter of British membership of the Community30. This was the beginning 
of the apparent ›shift‹ in both Labour’s stance and that of Wilson’s own position 
on European membership from predominantly supportive of British entry to 
increasingly sceptical31.  
 As for Wilson after 1970, outside of intra-party debates he still seemed as 
supportive of British membership as he had been before. In this regard, party-level 
meetings with his socialist counterparts were to prove important. Wilson himself 
suggested at the beginning of 1971 that there should be either a meeting of the 
Contact Committee or a leadership-level gathering to discuss Edward Heath’s 
negotiations with Brussels32. This would not come about for some months, in the 
form of a gathering of leaders on the edge of the Socialist International in 
Helsinki. What is remarkable about Wilson’s comments when the meeting did get 
underway was just how similar they were to statements he had made as prime 
                                                
29 LHA, NEC Minutes 22 July 1970, minutes of meeting of the NEC, 22 July 1970.  
30 LHA, NEC Minutes 27 January 1971, ID/1970–71/28, Resolutions received from Constituency Labour 
Parties and Trade Unions, January 1971.  
31 BROAD, Labour’s European dilemmas (as in n. 8), p. 81; Ben PIMLOTT, Harold Wilson, London 1992, p. 
581–583. 
32 LHA, NEC Minutes 27 January 1971, NEC 5/1970/71, comments by Wilson, 27 January 1971. 
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minister. Thus, while he began by stating how officially there were several 
questions on which Labour »will decide its attitude« the overall impression he 
gave was positive, never straying further than to repeat as before that the party 
supported membership providing certain safeguards were met33. Irrespective of 
the domestic party debates that were already emerging over EC membership, then, 
comments made at an international level seemed to confirm that nothing had 
changed and that Wilson remained committed to securing British accession to the 
Community. This suggests that transnational party relations had a fifth function 
for the Labour party in addition to the four mentioned above. For the transnational 
setting could provide a measure of continuity for the leadership and a chance for 
them to discuss the intricacies of British membership at a time when domestic 
party politics caused opinions to vacillate and discussions over the basic premise 
of British accession to become ever more contentious. 
For the likes of Labour’s international secretary Tom McNally, cross-border 
party relations were now more salient than ever. Writing shortly after the Helsinki 
gathering, he explained: »There is a political value in the direct personal contact 
between party leaders«34. It is clear in such statements that transnational contact 
mattered to leading party figures at the time. As was to be the case following 
Labour’s special conference, which was designed to debate the Conservatives’ 
White Paper on EC membership published on 7 July 1971. Just ten days later, 
Wilson faced his most challenging test in party management since returning to 
opposition. Having stated at Helsinki that Labour was broadly supportive of 
membership, Wilson appeared to lurch decisively towards an anti-EC position35. 
This would end in the Labour NEC officially rejecting Heath’s terms and 
demanding a referendum on continued British membership36. The consensus of 
the existing historiography is that party political calculations influenced Wilson’s 
                                                
33 Bodleian, Harold Wilson papers, MS. Wilson c.1171, transcript of Wilson speech to Socialist International, 
25 May 1971.  
34 LHA, NEC Minutes 23 June 1971, report on Socialist International conference in Helsinki 25–27 May 
1971, 7 June 1971.  
35 Labour Party, Labour and the Common Market. Report of a special conference of the Labour Party, 
London 1971, p. 42–49.  
36 LHA, NEC Minutes 28 July 1971, minutes of meeting of the NEC, 28 July 1971. 
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apparent change of heart37. In this analysis, Wilson sought to reinvigorate support 
for his leadership among the left wing in order to stave off a challenge from Jim 
Callaghan, then Labour’s spokesman for the Home Office. Certainly Per Kleppe, 
present at the conference for the DNA and the party’s trade and shipping minister, 
felt that Wilson’s comments were party-related. »It was said to me«, he wrote in a 
later report, »that this was necessary for the cohesion in the party«. Callaghan, he 
continued, had positioned himself as a potential successor to Wilson and could 
use the trade unions to boost his support, but given that Wilson »had come off the 
fence and down on the critical side, he has averted this challenge from Callaghan. 
It was said to me that if Wilson had not done so, his position as party leader would 
have been seriously threatened«38. 
 Because of this perhaps, Wilson’s supposed tilt against entry did appear to 
be a pragmatic decision made within an environment of party disunity and 
challenges to his leadership. The interesting thing from the perspective of this 
chapter is the subsequent efforts Wilson made to offset his remarks through party-
level cooperation. In fact, at a socialist leaders’ meeting in Salzburg later in 
September 1971, and again the following year at the Socialist International 
conference in Vienna, Wilson consistently explained to his international 
colleagues that his position remained firmly that of supporting British 
membership of the Community. A report of the Salzburg meeting by the Danish 
SD even claimed that Wilson »assured the assembled socialist leaders that he and 
the Labour party were still basically very much in favour of progress towards the 
European unity« and that »a future Labour Government would not endeavour to 
take Britain out of the Common Market once she was in«39. Wilson’s use of cross-
border contact consequently suggests that such contact had an important role in 
sidestepping the domestic party arena, the Labour leader using transnational 
cooperation to inform other parties – and by virtue the governments of the Six 
                                                
37 PIMLOTT, Harold Wilson (as in n. 31), p. 582–583; Lynton ROBINS, The Reluctant Party. Labour and the 
EEC 1961–75, Ormskirk 1979, p. 96–97. 
38 Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek, Oslo, Per Kleppe papers, Da. Box 0044, Rapport fra det britiske 
arbeiderparti’s ekstraordinære kongress 17 juli 1971, 4 September 1971.  
39 ABA, SDA, Box 1227, The International in Action, 9 June 1972. For Wilson’s Vienna speech see LHA, 
Michael Foot papers, MF/C2, transcript of speech at Socialist International, 28 June 1972. 
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themselves – his aims with regard to British membership. Wilson clearly sought 
to minimise any backlash from other leaders and used successive socialist 
conferences to indicate his true intentions. This would prove vital in earning 
goodwill for the renegotiations that the Labour leadership would subsequently 
undertake.  
 Threats to Labour’s interests outside of Britain could also be dealt with by 
utilising links with its sister groups. The Labour leadership had always tried to 
conduct transnational relations in the context of an informal setting and beyond 
the media limelight. This remained effective for the most part, but other occasions 
required more interventionist, indeed more public signs of cooperation. The whole 
nature of party collaboration in particular changed in the run up to the Danish 
referendum on EC membership in October 1972. The SD leadership, engaged in a 
bitter dispute within its own ranks over Danish entry, arranged for a Labour figure 
to appear on Danish television to help make »direct, clear, simple, positive, 
sincere« statements, avoiding the »British way of politeness, modesty, 
understatements«. The figure would have to demonstrate not only that Britain 
intended to join and stay in the EC, but that a Labour Government »will not get 
England out«, that »England wants Denmark to join« and that »a Danish ›no‹ will 
not change the British position«40. As it transpired, George Brown was asked to 
fly to Denmark to support the SD and assist in the campaign for a ›yes‹ vote, 
including backing Krag and the SD elite in their support for Danish entry. It was 
not hard to understand why Labour went to such lengths; Stewart remarked in his 
diary that a no vote in Denmark »will make the situation inside the Labour Party 
worse than ever«41. It was thus in the mutual interest of both party leaderships that 
Labour came to have a small but no less significant role in the Danish vote.  
 Just as Labour looked to be at its most divided domestically, then, so the 
leadership clearly engaged with its socialist counterparts to facilitate the first 
enlargement of the Community in 1973. In the same vein, leaders’ meetings were 
a constant fixture in the years after the first enlargement, including in the period 
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that Labour once again assumed office and started to renegotiate British EC 
membership42. A first trawl of research seems to indicate that party contact 
perhaps played more of a role than might have been expected during the 
renegotiation process and in the resultant referendum. Central to this from 
Labour’s viewpoint was its relationship with the German Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), and in particular Helmut 
Schmidt. Notably, the German Chancellor addressed the Labour conference at the 
end of 1974 and he, Wilson and Callaghan were in constant contact over the 
content of Schmidt’s conference speech. According to Callaghan’s recollection of 
events, the SPD leader’s comments made a positive impression on Labour 
delegates43. Moreover, in a meeting between Wilson and Schmidt at Chequers the 
following weekend the Labour leader seems to have finally committed to Britain 
retaining its membership of the EC44. Even prior to the Dublin Summit of March 
1975 – during which final aspects of the renegotiated terms were due to be settled 
– it thus seems Schmidt had helped convince the prime minister of Britain’s fate, 
his concerns over the terms of continued membership allayed by concessions 
made during his meeting between the two men. But Schmidt’s presence at the 
Labour conference seemed more significant. In a sense, they helped prevent the 
party rejecting the ongoing negotiations there and then. Instead, the conference 
simply backed a motion that called for the referendum to have »top priority« for 
the government and for there to be a »balanced presentation of the views of those 
for or against membership«45. Little wonder, then, that when later reflecting on 
the British renegotiations Schmidt would describe it as nothing more than a 
cosmetic operation necessary to keep Labour divided on the question46. For 
renegotiation was essentially a party issue and Schmidt had played no small part 
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in prolonging what seemed an inevitable split for just that little bit longer. His 
speech, even for prominent Eurosceptic Barbara Castle, was »masterly«47. 
 All of this does seem to indicate that the historian trying to contend with 
Labour’s European policy in the 1970s needs to be mindful of party policy-
making beyond the national setting. There is no doubt, as is well known, that the 
Labour party became increasingly factious after 1970. On the contrary, Labour’s 
leaders were engaged with their socialist counterparts in Europe and presented an 
entirely different message at the transnational level than to the one proffered at the 
domestic one. Wilson had clearly accepted the need for Britain to join and this 
remained a constant policy goal even after Labour moved back into opposition in 
1970. In this sense, transnational relations proved a useful avenue to achieve the 
leadership’s goals at a time when party infighting effectively excluded the 
opportunity for Wilson and his team to champion British membership so 
forthrightly at home. 
 
Cementing a place in the Community 
After the referendum in June 1975 there was a gradual shift in emphasis from the 
Labour elite with regard to cross-border party relations. No longer did it use 
contact exclusively to facilitate British membership, rather in shaping the policies 
adopted by the Community of which Britain was now a member. In such a way, 
transnational cooperation appeared to develop a far more significant agenda-
setting function after Britain’s place in the Community was secure following the 
positive referendum result. The job of governing, in other words, could now get 
underway.  
 Within a transnational socialist setting, the question of Portugal took 
priority. In the words of Wilson, following the aftermath of the Carnation 
Revolution »not only Britain, but all our [EC] colleagues, were committed to 
support a democratic solution there«, a task made no easier by the apparent rise in 
influence of Portuguese communists48. Against this backdrop, there were calls 
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from Olof Palme of the Swedish Socialist Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska 
arbetareparti) to hold in August 1975 a socialist leaders’ meeting to give support 
to Portuguese socialists, something agreed to by Wilson. This was important. 
During the course of the referendum campaign the NEC had declined to assist 
those socialists who sought to coordinate the policies of Community states 
towards Portugal49. Within less than two months of the referendum however, the 
Labour leader now saw fit to engage with socialist colleagues on the question. 
Wilson, together with Palme, Bruno Kreisky, Willy Brandt (still SPD chair though 
no longer chancellor) and the Dutch socialist leader and then premier Joop den 
Uyl agreed to give Mário Soares »all possible help« with »the problem of 
strengthening democracy in Portugal«. Not only did the men recognise the need to 
give financial subsidies to the Portuguese channelled through the EC, but they 
also established the Committee of Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy and 
Socialism in Portugal to provide a permanent link between socialist parties, EC 
governments and Soares’ party in Portugal50. In other words, the transnational 
socialist framework was increasingly useful for developing policies that EC 
governments more generally might later pursue.  
 Significantly, sections of the Labour party increasingly refused to accept the 
referendum result. After a brief period of solidarity in Labour’s ranks, the likes of 
Castle soon questioned whether the party should accept future Community 
policies51. Such a refrain became more common, some doubting whether a ›yes‹ 
vote in the referendum translated into support for direct elections or EMU52. This 
makes the activity of the Labour leadership at the transnational level all the more 
remarkable. For despite the ongoing debates within Labour over the merits of 
British membership, the party leadership showed itself to be an active partner in 
Community policy-making at the European level. More important still, the 
environment of such action seemed to coalesce in the framework of transnational 
socialist party links. Following on from Wilson’s discussions over Portugal, his 
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successor, Jim Callaghan, continued to maintain close relations with key 
European socialist figures like François Mitterrand and Schmidt. Monetary aid 
was on the agenda when Callaghan and Brandt, by now president of the Socialist 
International, discussed the Community financing development programmes in 
southern Europe53. Similarly, Callaghan’s foreign secretary, David Owen, agreed 
to work with French socialists, then out of office, to try to combat the growth of 
communist parties in Community states. As Owen himself remarked, »There was 
a tendency to forget politics in inter-governmental contacts but […] socialist 
parties in Government must help their socialist friends, within the Community«54. 
With Owen’s comments in mind, transnational links no doubt had a role to play 
between Community states and third countries, including as an avenue for 
retaining contact between the EC and Norway55. 
 Old habits die hard however, and few of these actions could hide the fact 
that the Labour party more generally after 1975 seemed only to grow more hostile 
to EC policy-making in much the same way as the party leadership warmed to its 
newfound role as a Community actor. Notwithstanding Labour’s membership of 
the Socialist International, one area that remained especially contentious was the 
party’s involvement in institutionalised groupings at the European level, namely 
the EP Socialist Group and the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the EC56. 
Both were important institutions in their own right with links to the Socialist 
International. Previous authors are to an extent correct to pronounce Labour’s 
reservations over party cooperation at the European level57. For the PLP, NEC and 
party rank-and-file doubtless all met both the Socialist Group and Confederation 
with near-universal suspicion. Some – most obviously Peter Shore but also a 
considerable number of backbenchers in the PLP – even debated whether 
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Labour’s prospective eighteen members should join the Socialist Group at all now 
the party had decided to take up its seats in the EP, fearing as they did the 
apparently federalist aspirations and right-wing ideologies of the other socialist 
groups58. Linked to such inactivity, the party likewise continued to resist joining 
the Confederation after the referendum. When it did finally agree to work with it 
in April 1976, yet again it did so reluctantly and even then only as an observer59.
   
 This was symptomatic of the party’s hostile attitude to direct elections in the 
years that preceded the 1979 vote. Not all of the Labour movement was against 
them of course; some saw direct elections as a logical expansion of democratic 
control over the Community’s institutions. Yet the most explicit fear for sceptical 
Labour figures, and the one that dominated the NEC and much of the PLP prior to 
1979, was that direct elections were emblematic of a more general shift toward 
some sort of federal system60. Trepidation over direct elections fed into existing 
discontent over EMU, Brussels’ control over tax policy and the concept of free 
movement of capital, all of which were given as examples of Community 
overreach. At the same time, the NEC sought reform to an array of existing 
policies, not least the Community’s agricultural and overseas aid policies. On 
direct elections specifically, the likes of Jennie Lie expressed concern over 
‘different electoral traditions’, a nod to the fact that some thought an EC-wide 
vote would mean all nine Community countries having to adopt the same electoral 
system both in future EP and national plebiscites. Questions surrounding the date 
of direct elections and the issue of dual mandates – whether MPs in the Commons 
could also split their time by representing a European constituency – provoked 
similar controversy. And the weaknesses of the European Parliament were 
likewise deployed for the sceptics’ ends: »How could elections be justified to a 
body which had no powers?« the NEC heard in March 197661. The next year saw 
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conference vote by a two to one margin against British involvement in direct 
elections62. The NEC only changed its mind later on when it was clear that the 
vote would take place regardless of Labour’s position.  
 Naturally, the intensity of all of these views did not stop the leadership from 
adopting a different approach. In fact, within seven days of the referendum the 
Labour leadership maintained its support for direct elections – regardless of the 
views of the PLP, NEC or wider movement63. This was some eight months before 
the government published a White Paper detailing its policy on them. Subsequent 
assurances given by Callaghan throughout the next three years – that the 
government would only adopt a policy on direct elections in line with the party – 
were therefore little more than a window-dressing exercise to appease party 
Eurosceptics64. The leadership’s stance towards direct elections mirrored its 
approach to formalised relations with other socialist groups within the framework 
of the Community. With regard to the EP Socialist Group, Labour officials were 
adamant that the party’s representatives – officially called the Labour Group – 
should join the larger Socialist Group of parties in the EP immediately after the 
referendum, again despite the doubts expressed by certain sections of the NEC 
and PLP. Not joining, as Roy Hattersley noted, would »be seen as a tremendous 
affront by our sister parties in the Socialist International«65. According to 
McNally, becoming members of the Socialist Group might also help in »nursing 
the Labour Group into a constructive posture within the European Parliament«66.  
For all the party’s hesitancy over the Socialist Group, therefore, the 
leadership maintained from the moment of the referendum that Labour had to be a 
full and active member of the EP alongside its socialist counterparts. As part of 
this goal, McNally and Cledwyn Jones, the pro-European PLP chair, turned to the 
German head of the EP Socialist Group, Ludwig Fellermaier. Between them, the 
three men discussed possible leaders of the Labour contingent who could best 
ensure that the party cooperated fully with other socialist parties in the EP; only a 
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»person with experience and sensitivity of what has been happening in the Party 
over the last few years« would do, the three men agreed67. What was more, they 
carved out a plan for Labour to occupy the vice-president position within the 
Socialist Group. This, they hoped, would bind the party’s members as closely as 
possible into the EP grouping. Furthermore, as part of its activities Fellermaier 
agreed to give Labour members greater say in specific working groups of the 
Socialist Group at the request of McNally and Hughes. Involvement in regional 
and industrial working parties of the Socialist Group were uncontentious issues, 
so McNally and Hughes hoped, and would provide a convenient distraction from 
the question of direct elections that otherwise dominated the thoughts of those 
who were likely to represent the party in the EP prior to the 1979 direct 
elections68. By the mid-1970s, the Labour leadership were thus adept to use 
informal, coordinated meetings with socialist figures in Europe to qualify the 
continued Euroscepticism that Labour continued to exhibit domestically. In effect, 
the Labour leadership seemed to hope that a degree of socialisation would take 
place on its own cohort of representatives as they engaged in the work of the 
Socialist Group.  
The informal political channels developed by the leadership described above 
could not help but have an impact on subsequent party policy towards European 
issues. They likely eased the NEC’s position on fighting the direct elections on a 
joint platform with the Confederation. For although the NEC excluded the idea, 
large elements of Labour’s manifesto for the elections was drawn from the 
Confederation’s document with only those elements on federalism deleted from 
the final version.69 And the joint home and international committee of the NEC 
even accepted the need to engage fully with the Confederation prior to the 
elections, as well as other national parties, even though there was a clear 
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differentiation between its views and those of other socialist groups70. As a result, 
membership of the Socialist Group and the Confederation became relatively 
normalised; the party’s representatives in the EP were remarkably active and, 
despite clear policy differences, they worked well with their counterparts in the 
European Parliament and officials in the Confederation71. It is thus reasonable to 
identify the groundwork put in by the leadership as one factor why despite the 
numerous doubts about Labour’s institutional links in the Community that were 
still rabid in the party, it did in fact engage with its counterparts at the European 
level. Once again, contact with socialist parties at the transnational level and 
within the Community structure do indicate that the popular narrative of Labour in 
the 1970s ought to be at least modified to reflect these elements.  
 
Conclusions  
Looking back on Labour’s recent past, the 1970s stand out as a desperate and 
depressing decade for the party. Not only did it witness tribal warfare like never 
before on the question of European membership. Labour also had to contend with 
Britain’s relative economic decline in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis and 
continued problems connected to increased labour turmoil and trade union strikes. 
Over time of course this would go some way to explaining the electoral decline of 
the party after 1979, a trend that would continue until its resurgence as New 
Labour and subsequent electoral victories under the leadership of Tony Blair. 
What, then, by re-examining Labour’s European policies in the 1970s can we add 
to this more typical picture of malaise and disunity? For a start, like the late 1950s 
and 1960s, the 1970s saw a huge amount of engagement by the Labour leadership 
with its socialist counterparts. The Labour elite clearly sought out, and saw value 
in, contact with other socialist groups in Western Europe. By focusing on such 
relations, it is equally clear that the years leading to direct elections in 1979 saw a 
good deal more consistency in the approach adopted by the Labour leadership to 
European integration than is often considered the case. In short, once the party 
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elite had committed to EC membership around 1966 they remained so thereafter – 
and socialist party cooperation was to provide a mechanism to help achieve this 
aim. Furthermore, once Britain’s place in the Community had been secured by 
virtue of the 1975 referendum, the 1970s also saw socialist links become a vehicle 
through which the Labour elite could hope to shape EC policies more generally. 
As part of this, the party leadership exhibited a remarkable degree of support for 
the Confederation and EP Socialist Group.  
 That as a result of such actions Labour actually fought in the direct elections 
in 1979 is, however, perhaps the most significant point to take from this chapter. 
In one respect it was an important moral and political victory for the leadership at 
a time when its authority was being increasingly challenged. More notable still, it 
also ensured that Labour remained a part of the Community apparatus even when 
domestically the party campaigned for British withdrawal under the leadership of 
Michael Foot. But it is perhaps in the medium- to long-term that the real 
significance of the decision to work with the Socialist Group, to associate with the 
Confederation and to take part in the direct elections becomes most obvious. For 
Labour representatives would after 1979 cement their position in the EP and find 
the value of the organisation as a platform to attack the policies of Margaret 
Thatcher. They would become involved in sponsoring resolutions and would work 
in an ever-growing number of parliamentary committees. And by the early 1990s 
Labour members would take a front seat in the legislative process and within the 
newfound Party of European Socialists, utilising the increasing powers of the 
parliament to formulate responses to a whole host of international issues in the 
shape of German reunification, the Gulf War and the Treaty of Maastricht72. In 
this sense, the efforts made by the Labour leadership in the mid- to late-1970s 
helped shape profoundly the work, policies and influence of the EP itself and 
ultimately the position of the parliament as an actor in the more general 
infrastructure of the Community and later European Union.  
 Taken together, these points do therefore suggest that it is vital to fit 
socialist party cooperation beyond the national level into the more general 
                                                
72 On these developments see POLLACK, Wreckers or Builders? (as in n. 67), p. 113–216. 
23 
 
narrative of Labour’s European policy in the 1970s. In so doing, a slightly more 
nuanced story of the party in this period becomes apparent, one where the 
leadership was, despite the travails that beset the party in this period, not as 
awkward a partner as is often claimed. The relationships certain party figures 
developed with their socialist counterparts before 1979 go some way to proving as 
much.  
 
 
